














































s FirmsOutsourcing with Heterogeneous Firms
Sasan Bakhtiari
Australian School of Business
University of New South Wales
Email: s.bakhtiari@unsw.edu.au
Abstract
A general framework for the study of outsourcing is introduced that incorporates
dynamics and heterogeneity among both upstream and downstream producers to mimic
an exit approach (Hirschman, 1970) to building vertical relations. The environment is
one of search friction and incomplete contracts, where ﬁnal-good producers require a
specialized input and, upon matching with a supplier, can only contract the quantity of
input. The results imply an assorted matching between producers and suppliers, so that
more productive producers pair with more productive suppliers in the long run. It is
shown that most eﬃcient producers have some propensity to outsource, but only when
there is a thick enough density of highly productive suppliers. Average employment in
this model might increase or decrease with outsourcing, which is an observed pattern in
the data. Some other diversities in plant-level behavior are also present in the results.
Keywords: Outsourcing, Productivity, Heterogeneity, Search Friction, Incomplete Con-
tracts, Exit Strategy.
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1 Introduction
A decision to outsource is often a complicated and risky one. One major consideration in
making this decision involves dealing with uncertainties that shroud a supplier’s performance
and the cost savings that will eventually follow. In building a new vertical relation, a special-
ized producer of a ﬁnal consumption good would make a take-it or leave-it oﬀer to a supplier;
a contract that describes the nature of input needed, the required quantity of input and its
price, and possibly the length of the contract. Helper (1991) especially ﬁnds such contracts
1a plausible assumption for the U.S. auto industry. For completeness, the contract would
also include a clause for a “clean” exit strategy, when the match does not work according
to expectations1. When an oﬀer is made, a supplier can then decide if she is able to meet
the requirements based on her current level of eﬃciency and costs. The contract should also
look attractive and valuable enough to the supplier for a successful match. Serious problems
arise in the relationship when a supplier is much larger and much more eﬃcient than the
producer2. In Hirschman (1970) terminology, both the producer and the supplier exercise
an exit approach with regard to relation building in a specialized environment: a ﬁnal good
producer drops suppliers that cannot support the level of production the producer wants to
achieve and searches for another supplier. In turn, a very large and eﬃcient supplier can
also walk away from an unattractive contract that will hold her back from seeking a more
valuable contract and larger proﬁts.
This paper tries to mimic the process described above by focusing on the exit approach to
building vertical relations among heterogeneous and specialized producers of a ﬁnal consump-
tion good, when the productivity of middle suppliers is also heterogeneous and unobservable
ex ante. This two-layered heterogeneity is particularly useful in generating substantial diver-
sity in outsourcing decisions and patterns that would follow. In this setting, unlike Grossman
& Helpman (2002), suppliers do not dictate producers the level of output while creating a
serious hold-up problem, but make a decision when oﬀered a take-it or leave-it contract from
a producer who decides the scale of her operation independently and optimally.
Future search is also made possible, so both producers and suppliers form their own
outside options when evaluating a potential contract. Two certain behaviors can arise from
such setting: ﬁrst, producers and suppliers become selective about whom they want to pair
with. This selection process leads to a rough assortment of productivity among producers
and suppliers that stay matched together in the long run, so that, on average, more eﬃcient
producers pair with more eﬃcient suppliers. Second, producers might hesitate entering the
search market in fear of having to put up with a not-so-eﬃcient supplier, or, since search
embodies opportunity costs of deviating eﬀorts from production, having to search for a very
1For examples see “Avoid Future Trouble: Think Exit with Outsourcing Contracts”, Supplier Selection
and Management Report, Feb.2003, P.5.
2A supplier can become a nuisance or exploiting when she thinks she is not getting enough from her
contract, according to “How to Manage Suppliers When They Are Much Larger Than You”, Supplier Selection
and Management Report, May 2005, P.9.
2long period of time, maybe forever, for an attractive match.
The general framework borrows from the classic model of Grossman & Helpman (2002),
where specialized producers enter market freely and compete monopolistically. Each pro-
ducer needs a speciﬁc intermediate input that can be obtained either by internalizing its
production (vertical integration) or by forming a one-to-one relation with a specialized mid-
dle supplier (outsourcing). Accordingly, the production of ﬁnal good takes two processes: (i)
a core process, “ﬁnal production” or assembly, that has to be internalized at all times or the
producer ceases to exist, and (ii) an intermediate process, “middle production” or parts man-
ufacturing, that can be either internalized or contracted out to a middle supplier3. Producers
are diﬀerentiated in each process by making idiosyncratic draws of their labor productivities,
independently of each other and independently for each process within ﬁrm. The total labor
productivity of an integrated producer is then an aggregation of productivities for the two
processes.
Vertical integration distracts focus and requires a producer to use extra management
resources to coordinate and plan the whole production process, hence, internalizing is costly.
Specialized producers can alternatively form a relation with a middle supplier and procure
the required input in that way. In the latter case, the supplier agrees to specialize in the
production of the speciﬁc input and the producer forfeits her ability to input production. Any
break up of the relation after specialization has fully taken place results in both producer
and supplier exiting market.
In return, producers get a boost in their productivity on ﬁnal process by cutting manage-
rial costs. This boost also symbolizes the fact that outsourcing lets producers focus on their
core competencies (e.g. quality, unique features and presentation of product) and reinvest
in and improve their technology on the ﬁnal process. Middle suppliers are also assumed,
on average, more eﬃcient in the production of intermediate input than producers, to reﬂect
their higher degree of sophistication in their ﬁeld. This assumption, however, is not the most
crucial element in this model, and most results do not depend merely on that.
On the ﬂip side, there are two sources of transaction costs if a match is sought: search
friction and uncertainty about the productivity of suppliers. Going on search does not guar-
3Antras & Helpman (2004) use ”manufacturing” and ”headquarter services” to label upstream and down-
stream processes in an international setting.
3antee a match, and a match can be broken by uninterested supplying party. Contractual
incompleteness described by Grossman & Hart (1986) is also present, so that producers can
only contract the quantity of input they need, but the quality cannot be veriﬁed by a third
party. Since specializtion practically ties both producer and supplier into a permanent rela-
tionship, suppliers have incentive to oﬀer low quality input, with zero value to production,
and increase their proﬁt margin. To give a supplier the incentive to deliver high-quality input
and make the long-term perspective of the relationship proﬁtable, as in Grossman & Help-
man (2002), both parties renegotiate their shares of total revenue through a Nash bargaining
after input is ready.
The outcome of matches in this model is equivalent to both producers and suppliers
exercising the exit approach. The more eﬃcient producers do not stay matched to less eﬃcient
suppliers, mainly because the supplier cannot handle the quantity of input demanded and
stay proﬁtable at the same time. More eﬃcient suppliers also drop less eﬃcient producers
and go on search again, since their option value is more promising and proﬁtable. This
two-sided strategy is summarized in a supplier forming a range of acceptable productivities
she should be contented with, and the decision to keep or break a match depends on the
productivity of the matched producer falling into that interval. In the long run, on average,
more eﬃcient producers and suppliers stay matched, while other matches break, so that the
expected productivity of producers increases monotonically with the expected productivity
of their suppliers.
As suppliers get very eﬃcient, however, they become less selective and would match to
any producer that is reasonably productive, mostly because the density of high-productivity
producers declines. The monotonic relation discussed above becomes concave as a result. On
the other hand, producers have the option to internalize their input production, and, in the
presence of search frictions and uncertainty about suppliers’ productivity, the most eﬃcient
producers would outsource only if there is a dense enough distribution of high-productivity
suppliers, so that the expected search time to forming a successful match is reasonably short
for them.
In response to outsourcing, the model manages to make producers either expand or shrink
in employment size. Outsourcing encompasses two opposing eﬀects on the size of a producer.
4The productivity boost makes them willing to expand, but they are also sending some jobs
away. The ﬁnal direction of change for average employment, as a result, stays ambiguous and
directly depends on the relative levels of costs and beneﬁts from outsourcing. On the other
hand, average output is most likely higher after outsourcing opens, although the model does
not rule out lower average output under some very exceptional circumstances.
The structure of the model also allows for two integrated producers with identical pro-
ductivities to behave diﬀerently, so that one of them stays integrated and the other one goes
on search for a supplier. The key to this diﬀerence in behavior is the fact that these two
producers have the same total productivity prior to outsourcing, but the one with higher
productivity in its ﬁnal process beneﬁts greatly from outsourcing and goes on search.
The rest of the paper proceeds as such: Next section reviews the general literature on
outsourcing and multi-nationalism. Section 3 sets up the theoretical model and describes the
outsourcing mechanism. Section 4 discusses the theoretical results. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Related Literature
Earlier studies of outsourcing have been mostly in the context of trade and cross-regional
or cross-country diﬀerences. Extensions of Heckscher-Ohlin model by Helpman (1984) and
Helpman (1985) describe conditions under which inter- and intra-ﬁrm trade is possible across
countries. Grossman & Helpman (2005) present a north-south model to explain the geograph-
ical aspects of domestic versus international outsourcing.
Grossman & Hart (1986) and Hart & Moore (1990) show how contractual incompleteness
leads to certain ownership issues within both integrated and outsourcing ﬁrms. Based on
those results, Grossman & Helpman (2002) relate outsourcing behavior to the costs borne of
incomplete contracts and search frictions. Brieﬂy, if beneﬁts from outsourcing surpass its im-
plied costs, the whole industry outsources, and stays integrated otherwise. Antras (2003) and
Antras & Helpman (2004) use similar approaches to explain diﬀerent patterns of integration
versus outsourcing. Grossman & Helpman (2004) use ability to observe managerial eﬀorts
to get similar results. The eﬀect of trade openness on outsourcing behavior is described by
McLaren (2000). He argues that, in a closed economy, suppliers have very weak bargaining
5power, giving them the incentive to integrate. As trade opens, this position changes and
causes many suppliers to choose independence, increasing the pervasiveness of outsourcing.
Finally, Naghavi & Ottaviano (2009a) study the eﬀect of oﬀshoring (international outsourc-
ing) on the rate of innovation using a dynamic model and show that oﬀshoring can weaken
feedback links from production to R&D and reduce innovation rates.
Antras & Helpman (2004) and Grossman & Helpman (2004) are two papers that incorpo-
rate ﬁrm heterogeneity into outsourcing decision. Assche & Schwartz (2009) generate similar
results by relaxing the input speciﬁcity assumption. Antras & Helpman (2006) generalize the
framework from Antras & Helpman (2004) to include varying levels of contractability across
countries. Naghavi & Ottaviano (2009b) study dynamic implications of having heterogeneity
in the production of input. This paper extends some of those results by adding a two-layered
heterogeneity in productivities, which helps to study the organization of an industry with
outsourcing possibilities in much ﬁner details. Also, the exit approach to forming relations,
used in this work, seems to model a managers outsourcing strategy more closely.
3 Theoretical Setup
3.1 Consumers
There is a representative consumer that gains utility over a continuum of consumption good








where J is the set of varieties being produced, and α<1. As a result, the elasticity of
substitution among varieties is constant and equal to 1/(1 − α) > 1. Dixit & Stiglitz (1977)
show that such economy can be represented by an aggregate output index Y = U and the











6The consumer’s optimal demand for each variety can then be found as a function of P and




where A = PY1−α is an aggregate index.
3.2 Integrated Firm
There is one sector, and each ﬁrm in this sector produces a distinct variety j ∈ J of the
consumption good. Since the space of varieties is continuous, the probability of two ﬁrms
producing the same variety is zero, hence, j indexes both variety and the corresponding ﬁrm.
To produce variety j, a ﬁrm has to ﬁrst produce a specialized intermediate input and
then adapt it to the distinct variety. The production of intermediate input and ﬁnal good
are both constant returns processes with labor as the only input. Specialized producers are
diﬀerentiated in their eﬃciency in producing the intermediate input and their eﬃciency in
producing the ﬁnal good. Speciﬁcally, producer j needs 1/φj units of labor to produce one
unit of input. φj is randomly drawn from a known cumulative distribution F(φ) with support
φ ≥ 0 and is observed after sinking all entry costs. Every unit of input is then transformed
into one unit of a specialized ﬁnal good using 1/λj units of labor. λj is also randomly drawn
from a known cumulative distribution G(λ) with support λ ≥ 0 and observed after entry.
The pair (λj,φ j) deﬁnes the overall production eﬃciency of ﬁrm j.
Total labor required by the integrated producer j to produce one unit of ﬁnal good can










In the remainder, index j will be dropped where it is not causing confusion.
For the moment, focus on the one-period behavior of a specialized producer in steady
state. Wage rate for the employed labor is ﬁxed in steady state and, without loss of generality,
normalized to one henceforth. I am also abstracting from ﬁxed costs and time variations in
productivities to keep the model tractable and help single out important results related to
4χj is practically the harmonic mean of λj and φj.
7outsourcing5. Dynamics and entry costs are discussed later in Section 3.4.
Producers decide their production level by maximizing the proﬁt function πV (χ)=Ayα
j −
y
χ; subscript V referring to vertical integration. Solving the ﬁrst-order condition gives a
















Note that, because of the constant-elasticity demand, producers charge a constant 1
α − 1
markup over their production costs.
3.3 Outsourcing Firm
A specialized producer can also procure the required input from a middle supplier. Upon
ﬁnding a supplier, the producer oﬀers her a contract describing the speciﬁcation and quantity
of input needed. The supplier has the option to accept this production plan or to break the
match. If plan is accepted, the supplier specializes as needed and production goes ahead
with returns described below. The producer then forfeits her ability to input production
and relies solely on the supplier for input delivery. Thus, after specialization has fully taken
place, the producer and her supplier are practically tied in a permanent relation. Breaking
the match at this stage results in both the producer and her supplier exiting market. The
input produced in this stage is useless outside the speciﬁc relation, and a high quality input
is needed for production; low quality (defective) input is cheap to produce but has zero
value to production. On the other hand, if the match fails right in the beginning and before
specialization, both parties make zero proﬁt in that period and continue search in the next
period. For the moment, focus on the one-period operation of producers and suppliers.
Following Grossman & Hart (1986), I consider the relation between a producer and its
supplier to be governed by contractual incompleteness. producers can contract the required
5Including nonzero ﬁxed costs merely introduces a cutoﬀ productivity that limits the range of “operational”
productivities from below. However, the theoretical implications concerning outsourcing behavior would not
be aﬀected.
8quantity of input, but if they make an ex ante commitment to price, since the quality of
the intermediate good is not veriﬁable by a third party and the producer and supplier are
tied in a permanent relationship, the supplier has every incentive to oﬀer a low quality input
and increase its own margin of proﬁt. Ex post, however, both parties can renegotiate their
claims to ﬁnal revenue through a Nash bargaining. The supplier has already specialized in
an input that is useless outside the relation, hence, she is left with a weak bargaining power
at that point. Let the middle supplier’s bargaining power be ω ∈ (0,0.5), reﬂecting this weak
position. Middle supplier’s nonzero claims to ﬁnal revenue provides her with the incentive
to produce high-quality input.
Suppliers are also heterogeneous in their productivities, φo. φo is drawn from a cumulative
distribution H(φo) with support φo ≥ 0a n dE[φo] >E [φ]; the intermediate industry is
more sophisticated in input production and can oﬀer higher productivity on average. The
productivity of an individual supplier is unobservable by ﬁnal producers until after a match
is formed and the possibility of further search in that period is foregone. This uncertainty
is an additional risk factor producers should take into account when making decision about
their vertical structure.
The beneﬁt from outsourcing is that producers get a boost in their productivity on ﬁnal
process as a porportional increase in λj by a factor μ(> 1). This increase models a reduction
in ﬁxed costs as less managers are needed to oversight and coordinate production. It also
symbolizes the producer focusing on her core competencies, such as developing unique features
that make the product more attractive, and accounts for improvement in ﬁnal productivity
as a result of the producer reinvesting some of the extra revenue to improve her current
technology.
An outsourcing decision starts by a specialized producer specifying the quantity of input
x(= y) she needs. The proﬁt function for specialized producer, given a match is formed, is
πS(λ)=( 1− ω)Ayα −
y
μλ; subscript S referring to specialized producer. Maximizing proﬁt
























The proﬁt for a middle supplier of productivity φo matched to a producer of productivity
λ is πM(λ,φo)=ωAxO(λ)α −
xO(λ)
φ ; subscript M referring to middle supplier. By delivering
















The operation of integrated and outsourcing producers speciﬁed above repeats in every pe-
riod, and future values are discounted for both producers and suppliers by a factor δ,w h e r e
δ ∈ (0,1). In every period, there is a failure rate ξ for a specialized producer which forces
the producer, along with the matched supplier if outsourcing, to exit. ξ is assumed non-
degenerate and exogenously given. In what follows, ξ mostly behaves like another discount
factor, in addition to δ. Therefore, to simplify matters, I deﬁne and use ˆ δ = ξδ where
appropriate.
Producers and suppliers ﬁnd each other through a search process. Let v be the number of
producers that enter as vertically integrated, s be the number of producers that enter seeking
to outsource, and m be the number of middle suppliers that enter. Number of matches formed
in a period is η(s,m), which is constant returns in s and m. All producers seeking a supplier
are equally likely to ﬁnd one, hence, the probability of a match is η(s,m)/s. With constant
returns matching, this probability can be stated as η(r)=η(1,r), where r = m/s.O nt h e
other hand, the probability of a supplier ﬁnding a match is η(s,m)/m or η(r)/r.O n c e a
match is formed, suppliers can decide if they want to keep the match or break it and go on
search again.
I assume a long-run situation where the dynamics of the industry has settled on a steady
state path. As a result, A, r, v, s,a n dm are time invariant. Specialized producers enter
freely into market, paying a ﬁxed entry cost ce > 0 to cover their start-up costs, such as
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Figure 1: The proﬁt function for a middle supplier and the range of λ productivities for
building successful matches. Two proﬁt function π1
M and π2
M are plotted corresponding to
productivities φ1 and φ2 (φ1 <φ 2).
paying a ﬁxed entry cost cm
e > 0. Entry costs for producers and suppliers need not be the
same.
3.5 Middle Supplier’s Decision
The proﬁt function (11) is not necessarily positive or, with the possibility of further search,
in the long-run interest of the supplier. In particular, if supplier expects higher proﬁts from
future search, it will break the match. To characterize the nature of this decision, note that,
in keeping a match, the present value of supplier is πM(λ,φo)/(1 − ˆ δ). Figure 1 shows a
supplier’s proﬁt as a function of λ and for two diﬀerent values of φo = φ1,φ 2 (φ2 >φ 1).
Clearly when the producer is too unproductive, relative to supplier, the supplier is better
oﬀ breaking the match and going on search again for a higher-productivity producer. On
the other hand, if the producer is too productive, relative to the supplier, the supplier is
unable to keep up with the demanded quantity of input with enough proﬁtability and might
even make negative proﬁts. Again, the supplier has incentive to break the match. Let the
lower and upper cutoﬀ productivity of λ corresponding to these cases be denoted as λ(φo)
and ¯ λ(φo), respectively, so that a φo-type supplier is willing to match to producers with
λ ∈ [λ(φo), ¯ λ(φo)].
11A supplier that breaks a match receives zero proﬁt in current period and ﬁnds a match
in next period with η(r)/r probability. The probability that this new match is accept-















probability there is no new match or the match fails and the game repeats. Denote
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G(¯ λ(φo)) − G(λ(φo))
 
E[πM(λ,φo)|λ(φo) ≤ λ ≤ ¯ λ(φo)]
1 − ˆ δ
.
A φo-type middle supplier breaks a match if the following holds
πM(λ,φo) < (1 − ˆ δ)VM(φo), (12)
The right-hand side above is constant with respect to λ and is represented by the horizontal
lines in Figure 1, whose intersections with proﬁt functions identify the threshold values λ
and ¯ λ. Alternatively, these threshold values can be obtained by solving (12) with equality.
The behavior of λ and ¯ λ as functions of φo is of particular interest and is described by the
following series of propositions.
Lemma 1 For any φo > 0, λ(φo) and ¯ λ(φo) exist such that λ(φo) > 0 and ¯ λ(φo) >λ (φo).
Lemma 2 If ˆ δ is large enough, then dλ/dφo > 0 and d¯ λ/dφo > 0.
Lemma 3 As φo →∞ , λ(φo) → Λ and ¯ λ(φo) →∞ ,w h e r e0 < Λ < ∞.
Proof for all lemmas and propositions can be found in Appendix A. Lemma 1 says that
each supplier with nonzero productivity has incentive to match with a nonempty set of pro-
ducers. Lemma 2 shows that as suppliers get more productive, they seek more productive
producers. But, from Lemma 3 it is clear that as φo becomes very large, suppliers become
less selective about the producers they want to match with, partly because the probability
of ﬁnding a high-λ producer diminishes. Lemma 2 requires that ˆ δ be large enough, empha-
sizing that the selectiveness of matches among suppliers holds best when future matters and
suppliers think long-term.
123.6 Specialized Producer’s Decision
The implications of Lemma 2 are far reaching in terms of what kinds of matches between
suppliers and producers are successful. The following looks at this issue from the producer’s
point of view:
Lemma 4 For a specialized producer with productivity pair (λ,φ) and for ˆ δ large enough,
there exist φ
o(λ) and ¯ φo(λ) such that the specialized producer can build a lasting match with
any supplier of productivity φo ∈ [φ
o(λ), ¯ φo(λ)].
Lemma 5 If ˆ δ is large enough, then
dφ
o(λ)
dλ > 0 and
d¯ φo(λ)
dλ > 0.
Lemma 6 As λ →∞ , φ
o(λ) →∞and ¯ φo(λ) →∞ .
Lemma 5 says that high-λ producers seek high-productivity suppliers. Lemma 6 shows
that, contrary to suppliers, producers stay selective about their suppliers as λ gets very large,
mainly because they have the option to internalize.
If a producer decides to outsource in the current period, a successful match happens
with η(r)
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there is no match or the match fails. Since nothing
has changed for the producer, the decision to search further is still optimal and the game
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.
On the other hand, if this producer stays fully integrated, its present value would be
VV (λ,φ)=πV (χ)/(1 − ˆ δ). A λ-type producer outsources if
VV (λ,φ) <V S(λ). (13)
The right-hand side is constant for any given λ, while the left-hand side is monotonically
increasing with φ.B u t ,VV (λ,∞) is bounded, and an intersection is not necessarily guaran-
teed. Especially, if μ is much larger than one, then all producers ﬁnd it optimal to outsource
as the beneﬁts overshadow any cost. To have an industry that is a mix of both vertically
13integrated and outsourcing producers, the cost and beneﬁt of outsourcing should be in some
balance as described below:
Proposition 1 If (1 − ω)μα < 1, then the equilibrium is a mix of vertically integrated and
outsourcing producers.
In a mixed equilibrium, VV (λ,φ)a n dVS(λ) intersect at a φ∗(λ), where a λ-type specialized
producer outsources if φ<φ ∗(λ) and stays integrated otherwise.
Proposition 2 In a mixed equilibrium, φ∗(0) = 0.A l s o ,t h e r ee x i s t sa˜ λ>0 (with possibility
of ˜ λ →∞ ) such that dφ∗(λ)/dλ > 0 for λ ∈ [0, ˜ λ].
3.7 Closing the Model
Free Entry
Specialized producers enter freely, therefore they should expect to make zero proﬁts in steady
state to curb excessive entry. Zero expected proﬁt condition requires that
  ∞
0






The left-hand side above is the expected proﬁt of an outsourcing versus integrated producer.
T h i sp r o ﬁ ti so ﬀ s e tb yt h ec o s to fe n t r yt os e ti tt oz e r o .
Suppliers also enter freely and their zero proﬁt condition can be formulated as
  ∞
0




Solving equations (14) and (15) together provides the two unknowns A and r.
Labor Clearing
Assume the industry is endowed with a ﬁxed amount of labor L. In steady state the labor
demand is equal to labor supply. In equilibrium, let the mass of integrated producers be N
and the mass of outsourcing producers be M. Then the condition is
  ∞
0



















. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the labor used by all
integrated producers, and the second term is the labor used by the matched outsourcing







Equations (16) and (17) together provide the values for N and M.
Entry and Exit
In steady state,








The ﬁrst condition sets the number of producers entering as vertically integrated equal to the
corresponding number of exits. The second condition is the same thing but for outsourcing
producers. sη(r) is the number of matches formed in each period, and the integral term is
the fraction of those matches that survives. Since r is already known from solving the free
entry condition, then m = rs.
Deﬁnition 1 A steady state equilibrium for the outsourcing problem with heterogeneous pro-
ducers and heterogeneous suppliers is the tuplet (λ(φo), ¯ λ(φo),φ
o(λ), ¯ φo(λ),φ ∗(λ),A,N,M,v,s,m)
such that (i) λ(φo) and ¯ λ(φo) satisfy (12) with equality, (ii) φ
o(λ) and ¯ φo(λ) satisfy (13) with
equality, and (iii) (14), (15), (16), (17),a n d(18) are satisﬁed, given values of α, L, ce, cm
e ,
ω, μ, δ, ξ and the distributions F(φ), G(λ) and H(φo).
4 Theoretical Results
This section discusses the diversity of outsourcing practices among producers in the hetero-
geneous environment presented in Section 3. Several implications of the model are shown
through a series of propositions.
Outsourcing beneﬁts producers by boosting their eﬃciency in their ﬁnal good production.




Figure 2: An illustration of suppliers and producers that stay matched in the long run on
the productivity plane.
and lower φ, multiplies its beneﬁts from outsourcing and would optimally go on search. The
ﬁrm with lower λ and higher φ has more to lose, especially with the prospect of having to
match to a supplier with productivity level φo <φ . As a result:
Proposition 3 In a mixed equilibrium, two integrated producers with the same total pro-
ductivity can end up in diﬀerent paths, with one of them outsourcing and the other staying
integrated.
As shown in Lemma 2, not every producer can form a lasting match with a certain
supplier. The range of productivities that would stay matched is a window of productivities
[λ(φo), ¯ λ(φo)], that moves towards higher productivities as φo gets larger. The same reasoning
applies to suppliers. The area deﬁned by these two ranges is illustrated in Figure 2 and leads
to the following result:
Proposition 4 On average, specialized producers with higher productivity on their ﬁnal pro-
cess form successful and lasting matches with more productive middle suppliers. Conversely,
on average, specialized producers with lower productivity on their ﬁnal process form successful
and lasting matches with less productive middle suppliers.
Lemma 2 especially shows that suppliers become less selective as they become increasingly
productive. This is expected as the density of high-λ producers diminishes. On the other
hand, high-λ producers have the option to internalize their input production and would
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Figure 3: (a) Threshold productivity when the density of high-productivity suppliers is low,
and (b) threshold productivity when the density of high-productivity suppliers is high. Three
productivity contours for levels χ1   χ2   χ3 (low/mid/high productivity) are also illus-
trated.
reasonably short. The productivity distribution of suppliers is an important factor, and
thicker upper tail on that distribution corresponds to shorter expected search time for high-λ
producers and lower opportunity cost from going on search. The next proposition formalizes
this argument.
Proposition 5 If ﬁnding a high-productivity middle-supplier is probable enough, a nonzero
fraction of high-λ producers outsource. If ﬁnding a high-productivity middle-supplier is im-
probable enough, then all high-λ producers stay integrated.
In particular, this model predicts that some high-productivity integrated producers (with
high values of χ) should be outsourcing.
Proposition 6 If ﬁnding a high-productivity middle-supplier is probable enough, the set of
high-productivity integrated producers that go on search for a middle supplier is nonempty.
This porposition comes as a corollaryto Proposition 5 because very high-productivity inte-
grated producers are those with high λ’s. With the probability of ﬁnding a high-productivity
supplier large enough, Proposition 5 predicts that a proportion of these producers should be
outsourcing (Figure 3).
Outsourcing is generally taken as synonym for downsizing as producers shed oﬀ some
extra labor in the process. At the same time, an increased eﬃciency on the production
17of ﬁnal good favors labor and output expansion. These two eﬀects work in the opposite
directions, and the average size of the industry might move in either direction depending on
which eﬀect dominates. The following proposition outlines relevant conditions for expansion
or shrinkage of size in response to outsourcing:
Proposition 7 There exist threshold values M1 and M2 (M2 >M 1) such that both M1 and
M2 are decreasing in (1 − ω)μ and
1. If λ/φ > M2: The outsourcing producer expands in both output and labor size.
2. If M2 ≥ λ/φ > M1: The outsourcing producer expands in output but shrinks in labor
size.
3. If λ/φ ≤ M1: The outsourcing producer shrinks in both output and labor size.
When (1 − ω)μ ≥ 1, outsourcing always results in expansion in both output and labor size.
Notice that (1 − ω)μ is the net productivity gain from outsourcing accounting for its trans-
action cost embodied by ω. The proposition says that the relative eﬃciency of a producer in
its ﬁnal good and intermediate input processes decides the ﬁnal direction of size change. If
an outsourcing producer is relatively more eﬃcient in producing the output than input, the
productivity gain eﬀect dominates. When the producer is relatively more eﬃcient in produc-
ing input rather than output, the reverse holds. In a special case, when (1 − ω)μ ≥ 1, the
productivity gain eﬀect is overwhelming, resulting in all outsourcing producers to expand.
In the light of Proposition 7, the net eﬀect of outsourcing on industry size might be
positive or negative. Case 3 in Proposition 7 is an unlikely case, because ﬁrms with high
values of φ would not outsource unless (1 − ω)μ is very large. As a result, the average
industrial output most likely increases with outsourcing, while the direction of change for
average size is still ambiguous. The ambiguity can be resolved once the actual distributions
of φ and λ are known.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper extends the implications of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity and its eﬀect on outsourcing
patterns by introducing a model with a two-layered heterogeneity where both upstream
18suppliers and downstream producers exercise the exit approachHirschman (1970). The model
is meant to mimic a more realistic and managerial approach to forming vertical relations. The
structure of the model allows for high-productivity ﬁrms to have some propensity to outsource
even if oﬀshoring is not an option, but only when the density of high-productivity suppliers in
the domestic market is large enough. It also lets ﬁrms with the same level of productivity to
behave diﬀerently, with one of them outsourcing and the other staying vertically integrated.
More importantly, this model suggests an assortment in the matches formed between suppliers
and producers, where, through a selection mechanism, producers and suppliers roughly match
their productivities when forming vertical relations. Some ambiguity, however, is left in
determining the direction of change in average employment size after outsourcing opens,
because ﬁrms adjust their size in a mixed manner. The average output, on the other hand,
is mostly predicted will rise. These features are supposed to ﬁt the productivity distribution
among outsourcing ﬁrms more closely.
A Technical Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :First, note that matching to some producer is always better than not
matching, which results in zero proﬁt. Therefore, the set of producers with whom the match
is kept is nonempty. Since πM(0,φ o) = 0 for any φo > 0, clearly λ(φo) > 0. The unimodal
form of πM(λ,φo) shows that any possible set of solutions will form one connected interval
[λ(φo), ¯ λ(φo)]. Let λ(φo)=¯ λ(φo) for any φo; i.e, the set of producers that can have lasting
match with this supplier is measure zero. Then the right-hand side of (12) is zero. But, (11)
clearly shows that πM(λ,φo) > 0 for all λ<
ωφo
α(1−ω)μ, meaning that the set [λ, ¯ λ]m u s th a v e
nonzero measure. This is a contradiction to the initial assumption. Therefore, it must be
that ¯ λ(φo) >λ (φo). 














19I am dropping φo as argument where obvious to save space. Deﬁne
B ≡
r(1 − ˆ δ)
ˆ δη(r)
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πM ≡ πM(λ), ¯ πM ≡ πM(¯ λ).
Also let ˆ E[()] ≡
  ¯ λ
λ ()dG(λ).
To start with proof, at λ and ¯ λ we have
πM =¯ πM =
1
B + ¯ G − G
ˆ E[πM(λ)].
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Based on the preliminary results above, T is negative. Also, based on the preliminary results,
∂πM/∂φo <∂ ¯ πM/∂φo. Besides, ˆ E[∂πM/∂φo] >∂ π M/∂φo,a n dt h el a s tt e r mi nS will be
negative if ˆ δ is large enough (making B small enough). In this case, S is negative, making
dλ/dφo > 0.
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20From before, it is given that T<0. Also, given the preliminary results and noting that
now ˆ E[∂πM/∂φo] <∂ ¯ πM/∂φo, for large enough values of ˆ δ we have ¯ S<0. As a result,
d¯ λ/dφo > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 3: Let λ(φo) →∞as φo →∞ .I f ¯ λ(φo) stays ﬁnite, then it is an
immediate contradiction. Hence, assume that ¯ λ(φo) →∞ . Then, the right-hand side in (12)
goes to zero. But, πM(λ,∞) is positive for any value of λ>0, i.e. supplier is willing to
match with any specialized producer, which is a contradiction. Therefore, there should exist
a0< Λ < ∞, such that λ(φo) → Λa sφo →∞ .
Now assume that ¯ λ(φo) → ˆ Λ, Λ < ˆ Λ < ∞,a sφo →∞ . As a result, the right-hand side
in (12) converges to a constant K(Λ, ˆ Λ) < ∞. But, the supplier is obviously willing to match










which includes any λ>ˆ Λ, a contradiction to ˆ Λ being ﬁnite. Thus ¯ λ(φo) →∞as φo →∞ .




φo|¯ λ(φo) ≥ λ
 
. (21)
Since ¯ λ(φo) is continuous, increasing in φo,a n d¯ λ(φo) →∞as φo →∞ , the above solution










∞ if λ ≥ Λ.
(22)
Again, since λ(φo) is continuous and increasing in φo, the above solution exists. 
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 :Based on (21) and (22), it is immediately clear that φ
o(λ)a n d
¯ φo(λ) should both be increasing in λ. 
6just set πM(λ,∞) >K (ˆ Λ)
21P r o o fo fL e m m a6 :Letting λ>Λ, it is apparent that ¯ φo(λ) →∞ . Also, since ¯ λ(φo)
is an increasing and one-to-one mapping, from (21) it is clear that λ →∞implies that
φ
o(λ) →∞ . 
Proof of Proposition 1: Writing an algebraically simpliﬁed version of (13) shows that





H(¯ φo(λ)) − H(φ
o(λ))
 
1 − ˆ δ + ˆ δη(r)
 





(1 − ω)μα 1/α
λ.
The term in the ﬁrst parentheses in the right-hand side is less than or equal to one (try ˆ δ =0
and ˆ δ = 1). Consequently, if (1 − ω)μα < 1, then as φ →∞ , the inequality is violated, i.e.
there are producers that stay integrated. Obviously producers with φo = 0 outsource. So
there are both types of producers present in equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 2: from (13), φ∗(λ) can be written as φ∗(λ)=
P(λ)λ







H(¯ φo(λ)) − H(φ
o(λ))
 
1 − ˆ δ + ˆ δη(r)
 






But from (22), it can be inferred that ¯ φo(0) = 0. In turn, φ(0) ≤ ¯ φ(0) which gives φ(0) = 0.
As a result, P(λ) → 0a sλ → 0, causing φ∗(λ) → 0w h e nλ → 0.
In a mixed equilibrium, φ∗(λ) > 0f o rs o m eλ>0, which means that, by continuity of
φ∗(λ), there must exist a ˜ λ>0, such that dφ∗(λ)/dλ > 0f o rλ ∈ [0, ˜ λ]. 
Proof of Proposition 3: I just need to show that there is a nonempty set of producers
with the same total productivity but diﬀerent paths. Let λ1 = κ˜ λ,w h e r eκ<1a n d˜ λ comes
from Proposition 2. Deﬁne the following integrated producers:
Producer 1: has productivity pair
 






Producer 2: has productivity pair
 














λ1(λ1− )−φ∗(λ1)  >φ ∗(λ1) >φ ∗(λ1 − ), for small enough  . The last result comes
from Proposition 2 and the fact that φ∗(λ) is increasing at λ1. Similar reasoning shows that
22λ1φ
∗(λ1)(λ1+ )
λ1(λ1+ )+φ∗(λ1)  <φ ∗(λ1) <φ ∗(λ1 +  ), for small enough  . Therefore, for small enough  ,
producer 1 stays integrated, whereas producer 2 goes on search for a middle supplier. The
proposition is thus proved. 






H(¯ φo(λ)) − H(φ
o(λ))
 
1 − ˆ δ + ˆ δη(r)
 
H(¯ φo(λ)) − H(φ
o(λ))
  → 0.
But, at the same time, πS(λ) →∞ . There are two cases:
Case 1: H(¯ φo(λ)) − H(φ
o(λ)) = O(λn), where n<−α/(1 − α). In this case, for large
enough λ, R goes to zero faster than πS(.) goes to inﬁnity, and the right-hand side in
(13) goes to zero. As a result, the fraction of λ-type producers that outsource converges
to zero as λ →∞ . Notice that H(¯ φo(λ)) −H(φ
o(λ)), when λ →∞ , directly relates to
the density of high-productivity suppliers.
Case 2: H(¯ φo(λ)) − H(φ
o(λ)) = O(λn), where n>−α/(1 − α). In this case, H(.)g o e st o
zero more slowly than πS(.) goes to inﬁnity or stays positive, and the right-hand side
in (13) goes to inﬁnity. As a result, the fraction of λ-type producers that outsource
converges to one as λ →∞ . 
Proof of Proposition 7: Using (5) and (8), outsourcing leads to an expansion in output














 1/α − 1.
Deﬁne M1 = 1
(1−ω)μ − 1a n dM2 = 1  
(1−ω)μ
 1/α − 1. Obviously, if (1 − ω)μ ≥ 1, then
M1,M 2 ≤ 0 and expansion happens in both output and labor. Now, let (1 − ω)μ<1. In
this case M2 >M 1. Three ranges of values for λ/φ can be identiﬁed:
1. λ/φ > M2, where expansion happens in both output and labor size.
232. M2 ≥ λ/φ > M1, where expansion happens in output but labor shrinks.
3. λ/φ ≤ M1, where shrinkage happens in both output and labor size.
This completes the proof. 
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